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DROWNING IN THE STREAM OF COMMERCE: A
CRITIQUE OF SPROUL v. ROB & CHARLIES, INC.
Elliot Barela*

INTRODUCTION
Can New Mexico assert jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer?
This question deserves significant concern in New Mexico. China, Mexico, and Canada are the largest foreign importers of consumer goods in
New Mexico.1 In 2014, over two billion dollars in foreign goods entered
the state.2 Moreover, retailers like Wal-Mart sell substantial amounts of
consumer goods in New Mexico, most of which are produced overseas.3
These facts demonstrate that goods manufactured overseas are widespread in New Mexico. Probability dictates that some of those products
will cause an injury in the state; however, the manufacturer may escape
liability unless New Mexico can assert jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is “[a] government’s general power to exercise authority
over all persons and things within its territory.”4 Generally, jurisdiction is
divided into two categories––subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.5 Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s power to decide a particular issue.6 Personal jurisdiction addresses a court’s power to
bind the parties to its decisions.7 This note focuses on personal jurisdiction and New Mexico’s power over foreign manufacturers.
To assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer, New
Mexico must comply with the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend* University of New Mexico J.D. Candidate 2016.
1. Foreign Trade: State Imports for New Mexico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/state/data/imports/nm.html (last visited Nov.
13, 2014).
2. Id.
3. Jiang Jingjing, Wal-Mart’s China Inventory to hit US$18b this year, CHINA
DAILY (Nov. 29, 2004, 3:21 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/
29/content_395728.htm (“[M]ore than 70 per cent of the commodities sold in WalMart are made in China.”).
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009).
5. Ted Occhialino, Civil Procedure I 1 (2014) (unpublished textbook) (on file at
the University of New Mexico School of Law).
6. For federal courts, the U.S. Constitution governs subject matter jurisdiction.
Id. For state courts, subject matter jurisdiction is most commonly determined based
on a state’s constitution. Id.
7. Id. at 18.
829
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ment.8 Moreover, New Mexican courts must adhere to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of due process.9 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has been unable to provide a clear rule regarding personal jurisdiction.
For example, in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,10 a foreign manufacturer engaged a third party distributor to sell its goods in U.S.11 The
distributor indiscriminately sold the manufacturer’s products throughout
the country.12 The manufacturer’s product caused a severe injury in New
Jersey, but the Court held that the state could not assert jurisdiction over
the manufacturer.13 Unfortunately, the decision provided more confusion
than guidance. The Court’s fractured opinion only complicated the
framework for lower courts and left many questions unanswered.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals attempted to resolve those questions in Sproul v. Rob and Charlies, Inc.,14 but instead reached a split
decision just like the U.S. Supreme Court. Unlike J. McIntyre, Sproul
held that a foreign manufacturer who targets the national market was
subject to New Mexico’s jurisdiction.15 Although this approach intuitively
makes sense, this Note argues that Sproul reached the wrong result under
the due process jurisprudence.
Part I of this Note provides basic information on personal jurisdiction, summarizes the U.S. Supreme Court opinions guiding Sproul’s decision, and then summarizes the Sproul decision. Part II provides
information on the precedential value of split decisions. It also argues
that J. McIntyre and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California16 promulgate precedential holdings that must be adhered to by
lower courts. Part III argues that Sproul was incorrectly decided and violates due process. Next, the Note provides a constitutionally acceptable
alternative to Sproul. In doing so, the author argues that New Mexico law
already provides a method to consumers from defective products without
violating the U.S. Constitution.

8. Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., 2013-NMCA-072, ¶¶ 8–9, 304 P.3d 18 (plurality opinion).
9. Martin v. Hunter, 14 U.S. 304, 305–06 (1816) (establishing that the U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions interpreting federal
law).
10. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
11. Id. at 2786.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2782.
14. 2013-NMCA-072, 304 P.3d 18.
15. Id. ¶ 32.
16. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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I. BACKGROUND
This section provides basic information on personal jurisdiction.
Next, it summarizes the various opinions that Sproul considered in reaching its holding. Specifically, the opinions that are summarized are WorldWide Volkswagen v. Woodson,17Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court, and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro. The final portion of the
background summarizes Sproul.
A. The Basics of Jurisdiction
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the
power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant.”18 In order to satisfy due process, the defendant must
have sufficient minimum contacts in the forum so “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice” are not violated.19 Sufficient minimum
contacts do not include a defendant’s casual presence or an isolated
event.20
The minimum contacts necessary to satisfy due process may differ
depending on the category of personal jurisdiction asserted.21 Personal
jurisdiction is either general or specific.22 When a forum asserts general
jurisdiction, the defendant is bound by a court’s decision, even if the dispute arose from the defendant’s out-of-state activity.23 To assert general
jurisdiction the defendant’s minimum contacts must be “continuous and
systematic” such that the defendant is essentially “at home” in the forum.24 In contrast, specific jurisdiction is limited to “‘issues deriving from,
or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’”25

17. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
18. Id. at 291.
19. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’ ”) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
20. Id. at 317.
21. Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 9, 304 P.3d 18 (plurality
opinion). (“[T]he minimum contacts required for the state to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on whether the jurisdiction asserted is general (allpurpose) or specific (case-linked).”).
22. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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Furthermore, the defendant’s minimum contacts must relate to the forum
and the dispute at issue.26
1. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson
World-Wide Volkswagen was decided by a five to four majority.27
The case arose when the plaintiffs purchased an Audi in New York and
drove through Oklahoma in order to reach Arizona.28 While passing
through Oklahoma, the plaintiff’s vehicle was struck from behind, causing
a fire and injuring the plaintiffs.29 The plaintiffs filed suit in Oklahoma
and sought damages from the Audi dealership and the dealership’s distributor.30 The dealer sold vehicles exclusively in New York, while the
distributor’s operations were limited to New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.31 The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court concerned
Oklahoma’s power to assert jurisdiction over the dealer and distributor.32
The Court held that personal jurisdiction hinges on the defendant’s
minimum contacts.33 The importance of minimum contacts served two
fundamental and related interests––fairness to the defendant and preserving “coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”34 The Court stressed
that federalism played an important role in personal jurisdiction and implicitly limits a states power to reach beyond its borders.35 The Court further held that, “[t]he Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the state of its power
to render a valid judgment.”36 As such, the Court held that a forum specific analysis of minimum preserves state sovereignty.37
The Court also that held minimum contacts “protect[ ] the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.”38 Minimum contacts established that that the forums assertion of
jurisdiction did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

26. Id.
27. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
28. Id. at 288.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 288–89.
31. Id. at 289.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 286.
34. Id. at 291–92.
35. Id. at 293.
36. Id. at 294.
37. Id. at 293 (“[The] framers also intended that the States retain many essential
attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in
their courts.”).
38. Id. at 292.
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justice.39 The Court held that jurisdiction is fair if the “defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”40 Based on that point the
Court held that foreseeability alone could not establish personal jurisdiction.41 Additionally, the unilateral activity of an unrelated third party
could not establish a defendant’s minimum contacts in the forum.42
According to those principles, the Court held Oklahoma could not
assert jurisdiction over the nonresident car dealer or distributor.43 The
defendants never made a sale or performed services in Oklahoma.44 Nor
did the evidence show that the defendants advertised or intended to serve
the Oklahoma market through third parties.45 Conversely, the plaintiff’s
unilateral act in bringing the Audi to Oklahoma was not a minimum contact by the defendants.46 The Court rejected the argument that the defendants could foresee the product’s use in other states47 and reasoned,
“[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for
service of process.”48
Notwithstanding the Court’s previous holdings, it conceded that in
some instances, a state may assert jurisdiction over an out of state defendant.49 In doing so, the Court introduced the stream-of-commerce theory
as a means to assert jurisdiction over a non-present defendant whose interstate distribution channels are substantial enough to establish minimum contacts.50 The Court stated, “[t]he forum State does not exceed its
powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction
over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce
with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”51 Nonetheless, in World-Wide Volkswagen the Court held
that the defendant’s actions were not directed toward the state.52 Instead,

39. Id. The Court enumerated five fairness factors to consider when asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Id.
40. Id. at 297.
41. Id. at 295.
42. Id. at 298.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 295.
46. Id. at 298.
47. Id. at 296.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 297–98.
50. Id. at 297.
51. Id. at 297–98.
52. Id.
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the plaintiff’s unilateral actions brought the defendant’s product into
state.53
The Court also enumerated several factors related to fairness and
justice encompassed in due process.54 These include (1) the burden on the
defendant; (2) the forum’s interest in the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest; (4) the interstate judicial interest; and (5) the shared interstate interest in furthering substantive social policies.55 Yet, the Court did not
address these factors since it was determined that the defendants lacked
minimum contacts with the forum.56
Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun dissented.57 They believed
that the defendants intended to become part of a nationwide marketing
and distribution network58 and that the defendant’s products would likely
reach Oklahoma given the transitory nature of automobiles coupled with
the nation’s system of interstates.59 Likewise, the defendants intentionally
participated in nationwide service centers, which encouraged and facilitated travel and thereby established contacts wherever a service center is
located.60 That system also promoted the defendant’s sales and contributed to the defendant’s overall revenue.61 Accordingly, the dissent argued
that Oklahoma properly asserted jurisdiction and asserting jurisdiction
properly reflected the practical realities of interstate commerce.62
Justice Brennan wrote a separate dissent.63 Justice Brennan argued
that the Constitution did not require a forum with the most numerous
contacts, but simply a forum where the suit can be brought.64 For instance,
Oklahoma had sufficient contacts because the accident occurred in that
state, the plaintiffs were hospitalized there, and all the essential evidence
was held in Oklahoma.65

53. Id. at 298.
54. Id. at 292.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 299 (“Because we find that petitioners have no ‘contacts, ties, or relations’ with the State of Oklahoma . . . the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma is Reversed.”) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945)).
57. Id. at 313–17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 314.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 315.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 317.
63. Id. at 299–312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 301.
65. Id. at 305.
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Justice Brennan also proposed a different stream-of-commerce theory than the majority.66 Unlike the majority, foreseeability was the touchstone of Justice Brennan’s stream-of-commerce theory.67 Justice Brennan
analogized to Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.68 where a nonresident
corporation polluted Lake Erie.69 The corporation dumped pollutants
into a stream just outside of Ohio’s territorial limits and the stream carried the pollutants to Lake Erie.70 Although the corporation never entered Ohio, jurisdiction met due process because the river naturally
carried the pollutants down stream.71 According to Justice Brennan, this
case was just like Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.72 The defendant’s introduced its product into stream-of-commerce, which carried its product to
an equally predictable destination.73 As such, Oklahoma could assert jurisdiction over the defendants without offending due process.74
2. Asahi Metal Industry Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court
In Asahi, a defective tire caused a motorcycle accident in California.75 The accident resulted in severe injuries to the motorist and death to
the passenger.76 The motorist then sued Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese company that manufactured the tire.77 Cheng Shin subsequently filed an indemnification suit against Asahi Metal Industry Co., a Japanese
company.78 Asahi manufactured valve assemblies and sold them to Cheng
Shin79 but all sales between Asahi and Cheng Shin took place in Taiwan.80
The product arrived in California because Cheng Shin would incorporate
Asahi’s valves into its tires and sell them in throughout the state.81 Asahi
knew that its product was incorporated into Cheng Shin’s tires and sold in
66. Id. at 306.
67. Id.; Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 49, 304 P.3d 18 (plurality opinion).
68. 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
69. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 306 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 312–13.
75. Asahi Metal Industry Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1986)
(plurality opinion).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 105–06.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (noting that Cheng Shin sold its tires in multiple foreign markets, including
the United States).
81. Id. (noting that California comprised 20% of Cheng Shin’s total U.S. sales).
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the U.S.82 Nonetheless, Asahi argued that it never intended its products
to enter the U.S. market, much less California.83
Justice O’Conner authored the plurality opinion and was joined by
three other Justices.84 The plurality held that California could not assert
jurisdiction over Asahi and that due process required more than placing a
product into the stream-of-commerce.85 Rather, the defendant must, “indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State.”86 The
plurality held that this rule included, “designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or
marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as
the sales agent in the forum State.”87 The plurality then determined that,
“[the defendant] ha[d] no office, agents, employees, or property in California. It d[id] not advertise or otherwise solicit business in California. It
did not create, control, or employ the distribution system that brought its
valves to California.”88 Moreover, Asahi’s product was not specifically designed for the Californian market; instead, it was generically manufactured for a world market.89 As a result, the Court held that California’s
jurisdiction was improper since Asahi did not intend that its products
would enter the State.90
Justice Brennan concurred, but disagreed with the plurality’s
stream-of-commerce theory.91 According to the concurrence, “[t]he
stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to
the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale.”92 Furthermore, “as long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State,
the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise,” and forum’s
assertion of jurisdiction complied with due process.93 Based on these principals, Justice Brennan held that Cheng Shin did not unilaterally bring

82. Id. at 107.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 113.
86. Id. at 112.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 113.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 116–21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement) (Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion was joined by three other Justices).
92. Id. at 117.
93. Id.
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Asahi’s products into the Californian market.94 Instead, Asahi knowingly
introduced its product into the stream-of-commerce and profited from
sales in California.95
Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurrence.96 He concluded that
plurality’s opinion was unnecessary because “‘fair play and substantial
justice’ . . . defeated the reasonableness of jurisdiction.”97 Nonetheless,
Justice Stevens thought that the plurality’s purposeful availment standard
was indistinguishable from “‘mere awareness.’”98 Conversely, purposeful
availment should be defined by, “the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the components” that entered the forum.99 The concurrence thought 100,000 units of the defendant’s product arriving in
California likely evidenced purposeful availment.100
Despite Asahi’s splintered views regarding the stream-of-commerce,
the Court delivered a unanimous opinion concerning traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.101 Asahi held that a foreign defendant
was burdened by litigating in a foreign legal system and intercontinental
travel.102 Furthermore, the defendant’s burden superseded the plaintiff’s
interest in pursuing the suit in California.103 Cheng Shin’s interest centered on indemnification and that liability arose from a contract formed
overseas; therefore, it was more convenient for both companies to litigate
the dispute in Taiwan or Japan.104
The Court also held that Asahi’s burden outweighed the state’s interest in the dispute.105 The Court believed that California’s interest related solely to adjudicating the dispute between two foreign companies.106
As a result, the Court rejected the state’s argument that its interest
stemmed from promulgating safety standards.107 The Court further held
that California’s safety interest could be accomplished without asserting
94. Id. at 119–20.
95. Id. at 121.
96. Id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion was joined by two other Justices).
97. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–78 (1985).
98. Id. at 122.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Asahi, 480 U.S. 102, 104 (1986) (plurality opinion).
102. Id. at 114.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 114–15.
105. Id. at 114.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 114–15 (“The State Supreme Court’s definition of California’s interest,
however, was overly broad. The dispute between Cheng Shin and Asahi is primarily
about indemnification rather than safety standards.”).
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jurisdiction over Asahi.108 According to the Court, companies like Cheng
Shin would pressure its suppliers to manufacturer safe products, or bear
the burden of product liability California.109
Lastly, the Court addressed the interest of the “‘several states’” in
furthering the advancement of substantive social policies.110 However, unlike a domestic company, a foreign defendant invoked the interests of
various nations.111 Moreover, the Court held that foreign policy, which
was a federal interest, was implicitly implicated; therefore, the Court
strongly cautioned against asserting jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.112 On these grounds the Court stated, “[the] [f]ederal interest . . . will be best served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of
the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case, and an unwillingness to
find the serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal
interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State.”113 The Court
noted that jurisdiction crossing national borders required heightened precaution and a presumption of unfairness.114 Thus, the Court determined
that California’s jurisdiction was unfair to Asahi and violated due
process.115
3. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro
In J. McIntyre, the plaintiff injured his hand while using a machine
manufactured by the defendant.116 The plaintiff subsequently filed a product-liability suit in New Jersey.117 The defendant was a foreign manufacturer and lacked direct contacts in New Jersey.118 However, the defendant
utilized an unrelated U.S. distributor to sell its machines throughout
the country.119 It also attended U.S. trade shows and four of its machines
were located in New Jersey.120 Based on these facts, the plaintiff

108. Id. at 115.
109. Id. (“[S]imilar pressures will be placed on Asahi by the purchasers of its components as long as those who use Asahi components in their final products, and sell
those products in California, are subject to the application of California tort law.”).
110. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 480 U.S. 286 (1980)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (plurality
opinion).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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argued that the defendant targeted the national market, including New
Jersey.121 The state supreme court agreed, but offered additional justifications for jurisdiction.122 These included the defendant’s U.S. patents, control over its U.S. distributor, and goods on consignment with the U.S.
distributor.123 Furthermore, the defendant did not affirmatively exclude
New Jersey from national sale efforts.124
Justice Kennedy, joined by three other Justices, wrote for the plurality.125 According to the plurality, “the defendant’s purposeful availment . . . makes jurisdiction consistent with ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’”126 Moreover, the defendant must intend to
serve the forum by, “[minimum] contact[s] and acti[ons] directed at [the]
sovereign.”127 Moreover, the main question under due process is,
“whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the
power of a sovereign.”128 Based on these principals, the plurality rejected
any stream-of-commerce theory founded on the defendant’s mere
expectations.129
The plurality also established two principals that it considered fundamental to personal jurisdiction.130 The first principal was that, “personal
jurisdiction require[d] a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign,
analysis.”131 That principal prevented a state’s assertion of jurisdiction if
the defendant never intended to serve the forum.132 The second principal
contends that the United States is a separate sovereign from the states.133
Additionally, each state is a distinct sovereign from its sister states and if
a defendant lacks minimum contacts in one state but maintains minimum
contacts in another, assertion of jurisdiction would “upset the federal balance” between the states.134
Based on the defendant’s unintentional actions in the forum, the
plurality held that New Jersey’s assertion of jurisdiction violated due pro-

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2785.
at 2787.
at 2788.

at 2789.
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cess.135 The defendant did not have offices, employees, or property in the
state.136 The defendant also did not advertise or pay taxes in New
Jersey.137 The defendant’s only contacts were four machines and the plaintiff’s injury.138 Furthermore, the plurality determined that the defendant’s
actions outside New Jersey evidenced its intent to enter the U.S. market.
However, New Jersey was a separate forum and the defendant’s actions
were not specifically directed at the state.139
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the result but
for different reasons. Justice Breyer held that a single sale could not
amount to minimum contacts.140 According to the concurrence, even the
most liberal interpretation of the stream-of-commerce theory precluded
New Jersey’s assertion of jurisdiction.141 Therefore, the defendant was not
subject to the state’s jurisdiction because it failed to establish minimum
contacts in New Jersey.142
The concurrence rejected the plurality’s strict jurisdictional rules,
but also the New Jersey Supreme Court’s broad stream-of-commerce interpretation.143 The plurality’s rule was too rigid and failed take into account future circumstances.144 Conversely, New Jersey’s rule was too
extensive and was unsupported by the Court’s precedent.145 Justice
Breyer stated, “to adopt [New Jersey’s approach] would abandon the
heretofore accepted inquiry of whether, focusing upon the relationship
between ‘the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,’ it is fair, in light of
the defendant’s contacts with that forum, to subject the defendant to suit
there.”146 The concurrence believed that such an approach would return
to the outdated principle of a defendant’s liability to a “ suit ‘travel[ing]
with [his] chattel.’”147

135. Id. at 2791.
136. Id. at 2790.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2793.
144. Id. The concurrence believed that online retailers, like Amazon, may unjustifiably escape a state’s jurisdiction and the plurality’s rule was inflexible to facilitate
such an approach. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2793 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
147. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296
(1980)).
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In addition, Justice Breyer believed that the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s rule was unfair.148 Justice Breyer stated, “I cannot reconcile so
automatic a rule with the constitutional demand for ‘minimum contacts’
and ‘purposefu[l] avail[ment],’ each of which rest upon a particular notion of defendant-focused fairness.”149 The concurrence also thought that
New Jersey’s expansive rule would magnify this unfairness for foreign
defendants.150
Justice Ginsburg, joined by two other justices, dissented.151 The dissent argued that six Justices created a loophole by permitting manufactures to escape liability through utilizing unrelated distributors.152 The
dissent held that jurisdiction is appropriate where a defendant targets the
national market and its product causes injury in any of the 50 states.153
Moreover, the dissent argued that the majority departed from due process by focusing on federalism.154 The dissent stated that the defendant
“‘purposefully availed itself’ of the United States market nationwide, not
a market in a single State or a discrete collection of States.”155 Therefore,
New Jersey should be able to assert jurisdiction over the defendant.156
4. Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc.
In Sproul, the plaintiff purchased a mountain bike from a Santa Fe
bike shop, Rob and Charlies, Inc. (“R&C”).157 Fifteen years later, a serious accident occurred at a BMX course in Santa Fe, New Mexico.158
While going over a bump, the front wheel separated from the bike frame,
causing the plaintiff to be thrown from the bike, which resulted in severe
injuries.159 The plaintiff filed a products liability suit against R&C and
various defendants involved in manufacturing and delivering the bike to
R&C.160 R&C then filed an indemnification claim against Joy Co., the

148. See id. at 2793–94.
149. Id. at 2793 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2794–2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 2795.
153. Id. at 2800.
154. Id. at 2798 (citing Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703, n.10 (1982)).
155. Id. at 2801.
156. Id. at 2804.
157. Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 2, 304 P.3d 18 (plurality
opinion).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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manufacturer of the bike’s quick release mechanism.161 R&C asserted
that Joy Co. was partly liable for Sproul’s Injuries as an upstream manufacturer of the defective part.162 Joy Co. responded with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.163
Joy Co. designed and manufactured bicycle component parts.164 Joy
Co. manufactured its product in the Republic of China and was incorporated under Chinese law.165 Its principal places of business are in China
and Taiwan, but its products enter the U.S. market through a system of
U.S. distributors.166 Joy Co. was aware of this distribution network and
encouraged its products to be sold worldwide, including in the U.S. market; however, it avoided selling its products in Central and South
America.167 Joy Co. also had an employee residing in California, and that
employee provided customer service to all U.S. customers.168 Although
the employee serviced the entire U.S. market, the extent of said employee’s service in New Mexico was undeterminable in the opinion.169
The quick release mechanism incorporated into the plaintiff’s bike
entered the U.S. through J & B Importers (“J&B”).170 J&B is headquartered in Miami, Florida, and established multiple distribution centers to
serve the entire U.S. market.171 J&B’s Denver office sold the bike at issue
to R&C.172 Joy Co.’s products were also sold to K-Mart retail centers in
New Mexico, but it was unspecified if J&B supplied K-Mart.173
R&C argued that Joy Co. was subject to New Mexico’s jurisdiction
because the manufacturer maintained sufficient minimum contacts within
the state.174 Joy Co. argued that it lacked minimum contacts in New Mexico and never intended its products to reach New Mexico.175 Relying on
161. Id. ¶ 3. A quick release mechanism uses a single quick release lever operation
on the hub to enable the wheel to be easily installed and removed. See generally Sheldon Brown & John Allen, Bike Quick-Releases, HARRIS CYCLERY (Apr. 22, 2015,
7:57 PM), http://sheldonbrown.com/skewers.html.
162. Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 4.
163. Id.
164. Id. ¶ 28.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. ¶ 30.
168. Id. ¶ 28.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. ¶ 28; About Us, J&B, http://www.jbi.bike/web/about-us.php (last visited
Aug. 30, 2014).
172. Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 28.
173. Id. ¶ 29.
174. Id. ¶ 4.
175. Id.
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the plurality opinion in Asahi, the district court found that New Mexico
could not assert jurisdiction over Joy Co.176 In addition, the district court
found that New Mexico’s jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.177
Still, the district court certified R&C’s interlocutory appeal, which
the New Mexico Court of Appeals granted.178 The court unanimously
agreed that New Mexico did not have sufficient contacts to assert general
jurisdiction over Joy Co.179 Yet, the court sharply divided on specific jurisdiction and the precedential value of Asahi and J. McIntyre.180 Specifically, the main point of contention was the competing stream-ofcommerce theories.181 The plurality and concurring opinions held that
New Mexico could assert specific jurisdiction while the dissent disagreed.182 Honorable Judge Vanzi authored the plurality opinion, while
Honorable Judge Vigil authored the concurring opinion, and Honorable
Judge Kennedy authored the dissent.
The plurality held that New Mexico could assert jurisdiction under
the stream-of-commerce theory.183 Specifically, the plurality adopted
World-Wide Volkswagen’s stream-of-commerce theory.184 In addition, it
rejected Asahi and J. McIntyre because the U.S. Supreme Court was unable to reach a consensus on purposeful availment, minimum contacts, or
the stream-of-commerce theory. Instead, it held that World-Wide Volkswagen controlled because the decision was the most recent majority
holding from the U.S. Supreme Court.185 However, the plurality preferred
Justice Brennan’s stream-of-commerce theory, despite the fact that it was

176. Id. ¶ 38.
177. Id. ¶ 1.
178. Id.
179. Id. ¶ 11; id. ¶ 47 (Vigil, J., specially concurring); id. ¶ 54 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The court determined that it could not assert
general jurisdiction because the defendant’s connections with New Mexico did not
meet the minimum threshold. Id. ¶13 (plurality opinion). The court also noted that
Joy Co. was not incorporated, did not conduct substantial business operations, or
manufacture its products in New Mexico. Id.
180. Id. ¶ 47 (Vigil, J., specially concurring); id. ¶ 54 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part dissenting in part).
181. Id. ¶ 47 (Vigil, J., specially concurring); id. ¶ 54 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part dissenting in part).; id. ¶ 54 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part dissenting in part).
182. Id. ¶¶ 45, 47 Id. ¶ 47 (Vigil, J., specially concurring); id. ¶ 54 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part dissenting in part); id. ¶ 54 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part dissenting in part).
183. Id. ¶¶ 19, 34 (plurality opinion).
184. Id. ¶ 44.
185. Id.
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a solo-dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen.186 The plurality also held that
New Mexico courts appear to adhere to the World-Wide Volkswagen
stream-of-commerce theory.187 It cited several New Mexico Court of Appeals decisions to support that proposition.188 In addition, the plurality
cited the New Mexico Supreme Court’s sole decision that “deal[t] with
the notion of minimum contacts.”189
Based on the foregoing, the plurality held that Joy Co. targeted the
U.S. market, and in doing so purposefully availed itself to New Mexico’s
jurisdiction.190 Moreover, Joy Co.’s minimum contacts evidenced intent to
sell goods to New Mexican consumers.191 In support, the plurality held
that Joy Co. profited through selling goods to distributors that served the
New Mexican market.192 Joy Co. also employed a Californian employee to
provide customer service throughout the United States, including New
Mexico.193 Lastly, Joy Co.’s products met U.S. safety standards and were
intentionally sold in the U.S.; yet, it intentionally prevented its products
from entering markets in Latin American.194 For the plurality, those facts
determined that the defendant “manufactured the allegedly defective
product and placed it into the stream of commerce.”195 As such, the plurality stated, “[w]e believe that such directed efforts to the United States
market reflect a purposeful intent to reach a consumer [in New
Mexico].”196
The plurality then addressed traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.197 Joy Co. argued it was unduly burdened to defend itself
in a foreign legal system, but the plurality was un-persuaded.198 According

186. Id. ¶ 26 (“Reaffirming a preference for Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce
approach from World-Wide Volkswagen, we now turn to the facts in this case.”).
187. Id. ¶ 21.
188. Id. ¶¶ 21–23 (citing Visarraga v. Gates Rubber Co, 1986-NMCA-021, ¶ 22,
104 N.M. 143) (relying on World-Wide Volkswagen to determine New Mexico’s assertion of jurisdiction complied with due process); Roberts v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 1983NMCA-110, ¶ 14, 100 N.M. 363 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen for the proposition
that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being subject to New Mexico’s
jurisdiction)).
189. Id. ¶ 24 (citing Blount v. T.D. Publishing Corp., 1966-NMSC-262, 77 N.M.
384).
190. Id. ¶ 27.
191. Id. ¶ 31.
192. Id. ¶ 28.
193. Id.
194. Id. ¶ 30.
195. Id. ¶ 31.
196. Id. ¶ 31.
197. Id. ¶¶ 35–37.
198. Id. ¶ 36.
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to the plurality, “Joy Co. is not a small farmer or cottage industry potter
in a faraway country or state [which concerned Justice Breyer in J. McIntyre].”199 Nor was Joy Co. like the defendant in Asahi whose “component
parts were incorporated into another product abroad and then sold
throughout the United States.”200 Instead, Joy Co. was a large company
with revenues approaching forty-six million dollars and had direct business in the United States201 The plurality further held that Joy Co.’s actions in the United States exposed it to litigation in the United States.202
Accordingly, litigation in the United States, including New Mexico, was a
minimal burden to Joy Co.203
In addition, the plurality believed that the plaintiff’s and New Mexico’s interest outweighed Joy Co.’s. New Mexico had an interest in disputes that arose from defective products causing injuries to New Mexican
consumers.204 R&C’s interest was “manifest.” As such, the plurality held
that New Mexico could assert jurisdiction without violating traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.205
The plurality concluded with an explanation as to why it had declined to apply Asahi and J. McIntyre.206 The plurality determined that the
competing opinions in Asahi and J. McIntyre failed to garner a majority
of the Court.207 However, the plurality believed the overall majority in
Asahi supported the Justice Brennan stream-of-commerce theory.208
Thus, Joy Co.’s arguments that relied on those split decisions were dismissed outright.209
The concurrence agreed that New Mexico could assert jurisdiction,
but disagreed with the plurality’s rejection of Asahi and J. McIntyre.210
The concurrence determined that the stream-of-commerce consists of two
viewpoints, the “Justice Brennan view” and the “Justice O’Connor

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (evidencing Joy Co.’s U.S. business practices by holding U.S. patents, selling directly to U.S. manufacturers, and attending trade shows in Nevada).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. ¶ 37.
205. Id.
206. Id. ¶ 44.
207. Id.
208. Id. ¶ 41. Nonetheless Judge Vanzi concluded “the dueling Asahi opinions have
done little more than provide a muddled rubric for deciding stream of commerce
cases involving nonresident corporations.” Id.
209. Id. ¶ 32.
210. Id. ¶ 47 (Vigil, J. specially concurring).
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view.”211 However, the concurrence believed that either view supported
New Mexico’s jurisdiction over Joy Co. The “Justice Brennan view,” was
evidently supported in the plurality opinion, and the concurrence saw no
need to elaborate further.212 Moreover, the “Justice O’Conner view” supported New Mexico’s jurisdiction because Joy Co. established channels
for advice and marketed its product through a distributor.213 Joy Co. intended to benefit from New Mexico’s economy and by doing so, complied
with the J. McIntyre plurality.214
The dissent criticized the plurality as proffering to rely on a majority
in World-Wide Volkswagen, but instead adopted Justice Brennan’s solodissent.215 Rejecting that view,216 the dissent embraced the stream-of-commerce theory established by the plurality in Asahi.217 The dissent believed
that Joy Co.’s product merely made incidental contact with New Mexico
and was not reflective of Joy Co.’s intention to reach the state.218 Instead,
specific jurisdiction required “(1) the defendant [to] purposely direct its
activities toward the forum state or purposely avail itself of the privileges
of conducting activities there, and (2) [for] the controversy to arise[ ] out
of or is relate[ ] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.”219 The
dissent also noted that the dispute centered on indemnification, not product liability.220 Therefore, Joy Co.’s contacts in the state were incidental
with respect to the indemnification claim.221
The dissent then addressed J. McIntyre and argued that six Justices
agreed on key issues directly at point in Sproul.222 These include, “[a] specific effort to sell in the forum state, purposeful availment of the privilege
of doing business in the forum state and the expectation that one’s goods
will be purchased in the forum state.”223 As such, the dissent believed that
jurisdiction could not rest solely on the stream-of-commerce and foreseeability.224 Moreover, the dissent criticized the plurality for conflating con-

211. Id. ¶ 48.
212. Id. ¶ 52.
213. Id.
214. Id. ¶ 53.
215. Id. ¶ 55 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216. Id. ¶ 54.
217. Id. ¶ 56.
218. Id. ¶ 56.
219. Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 (1984)).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. ¶ 57.
223. Id.
224. Id. ¶ 61.
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tacts in New Mexico with the United States.225 It also argued that Joy Co.
had never made direct sales in New Mexico and its contacts in New Mexico were from third parties.226 Any approach that assessed purposeful
availment through defendant’s intention to serve a national market was a
sound for alarm.227
II. ARGUMENT
This section discusses the precedential value of fractured decisions
from the U.S. Supreme Court and argues that Asahi and J. McIntyre constitute precedential holdings that lower courts must adhere to.
A. Precedential Authority in Fractured Decisions
Split U.S. Supreme Court decisions may still provide precedential
value. In Marks v. United States,228 the Court was tasked with defining the
limits of obscenity and free speech based on its previous split decisions.229
The Court held that the plurality opinion in “Memoirs v. Massachusetts”230 commanded a majority of the Court and therefore carried precedential value. “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”231 In
Memoirs, a three Justice plurality held that obscene material was protected unless it was “ ‘utterly without redeeming social value.’”232 Justice
Black and Justice Douglas concurred but believed that the right to free
speech was absolute and the government could never censor obscenity.233
The final vote came from Justice Stewart who held that free speech does
not include hardcore pornography.234 The Court determined that the plurality represented the narrowest grounds in Memoirs because Justice
Black and Justice Douglas’ broad rule implicitly accepted the plurality’s
rule.235
225. Id. ¶ 58.
226. Id. ¶ 59.
227. Id. ¶ 60.
228. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
229. Id. at 188–89.
230. A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney Gen. of Com. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
231. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
232. Memoirs, 430 U.S. at 419.
233. Id. at 433.
234. Id. at 421.
235. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\45-3\NMX303.txt

848

unknown

Seq: 20

3-JUN-15

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

8:59

[Vol. 45

The narrowest grounds doctrine assumes that those supporting the
whole implicitly support the pieces of the whole.236 For example, suppose
nine people are asked what their favorite color is. A four-person plurality
likes red and blue, a two-person concurrence likes blue and orange, and a
three-person dissent likes yellow and green. A five person majority likes
blue. Although this example is highly simplified, it serves to illustrate the
underlying logic of the narrowest grounds doctrine.
B. Narrowest Grounds of Asahi and J. McIntyre
1. Asahi
Three separate opinions were authored in Asahi. Justice O’Conner’s
plurality held, “minimum contacts must come about by an action of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. . . . The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an
act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”237 In
contrast, Justice Brennan’s concurrence stated, “[t]he stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular
and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware [the forum may
properly assert its jurisdiction.]”238 Lastly, Justice Stevens’ concurrence
held, “purposeful availment requires a constitutional determination that
is affected by the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the
components.”239 Each opinion is summarized as follows:
TABLE 1.
Rule
Stream of Commerce Plus
Intention to Serve the
Forum = Due Process

Judicial Support

Four Justices (Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice
O’Conner, Justice Powell,
Justice Scalia)
Stream of Commerce = Due Three Justices (Justice
Process
Brennan, Justice White,
Justice Marshall, Justice
Blackmun)
Volume, Value and
Three Justices (Justice
Hazardous nature of the
Stevens, Justice White,
goods = Due Process
Justice Blackmun.)

Author of Opinion
Justice O’Conner

Justice Brennan

Justice Stevens

236. Ken Kurma, A Legitimacy Model for Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77
CORNELL. L. REV. 1593, 1596–97 (1992).
237. Asahi Metal Industry Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
238. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
239. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Under the narrowest grounds doctrine, Justice O’Conner’s Asahi
plurality does not garner a majority. In fact, both concurrences explicitly
reject her approach. However, a majority of Justices did not join Justice
Brennan either. Justice O’Conner’s plurality required an intentional act
to serve the forum, while Justice Brennan’s did not. Moreover, Justice
Steven’s concurrence required a showing of the type and quantity of
goods entering the forum; mere expectation under Justice Brennan’s approach does not meet that standard. Unfortunately, the narrowest
grounds doctrine does not shed light on which stream-of-commerce test
controls.
A split in the lowers courts illustrates the lack of a majority consensus in Asahi. The Federal Circuit Courts are divided along three views on
applicable stream-of-commerce test. The First, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits follow Justice O’Conner’s stream-of-commerce plus
test.240 The Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits adhere to Justice Brennan’s
stream-of-commerce test.241 The Second, Third, and Tenth circuits follow
both approaches. State courts are just as divided as the Federal Circuits.242
Importantly though, Asahi was unanimous on the issue of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, which established binding precedent to that concept.243 Other than that, the opinion did not promulgate a
precedential holding.
2. J. McIntyre
Like Asahi, J. McIntyre produced a fractured decision without a
clear majority. Justice Kennedy’s plurality adhered to Justice O’Conner’s
rationale in Asahi.244 Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion did not require
the defendant to target the forum, but did require a forum specific analysis.245 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent held that jurisdiction is proper if a defen-

240. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 479–80 (6th
Cir. 2003); Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945–46 (4th Cir. 1994);
Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992); Madara v. Hall, 916
F.2d 1510, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990).
241. Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 613–15
(8th Cir. 1994); Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir.
1993); Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992).
242. Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony, Confusion, and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37
CAP. U. L. REV. 681, 703–04, 704 n.132 (2009).
243. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–16 (plurality opinion).
244. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790–91 (2011) (plurality opinion).
245. Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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dant targets the national market.246 A break down of the various opinions
is as follows:
TABLE 2.
Rule
Stream of Commerce Plus
Intention to Serve the
Forum = Due Process

Judicial Support
Author of Opinion
Four Justices (Chief Justice Justice Kennedy
Roberts, Justice Kennedy,
Justice Scalia, Justice
Thomas)
Two Justices (Justice Breyer, Justice Breyer
Justice Alito)

Stream of Commerce but
Forum Specific Analysis of
the Defendant’s Minimum
Contacts is Required = Due
Process
Stream of Commerce Based Three Justices (Justice
Justice Ginsburg
on Intention to Serve the
Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg,
National Market = Due
Justice Kagan)
Process

The plurality’s test was affirmatively rejected by both the concurrence and the dissent. Both Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg held that
that the defendant was not required to target the forum in order for the
forum to have jurisdiction. However, there is an implicit consensus between the concurring opinion and the plurality. The plurality requires a
forum-by-forum (or sovereign-by-sovereign) analysis, while the concurring opinion required a focus “upon the relationship between ‘the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, and the “defendant’s contacts with
that forum, to subject the defendant to suit there.”247 The underlying consent affirmatively establishes that six Justices require a focus on the defendant’s in state activities, not his actions in the national market.
Additionally, both the concurrence and plurality rejected the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s national market approach and, instead, require a forum
specific analysis. Therefore, the controlling rule from J. McIntyre is that
“targeting the national market is not enough to impute jurisdiction to all
the forum States.”248 Other than this limited principle, J. McIntyre does
not command anything more.

246. Id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
248. Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 501, 513 (D.N.J.
2011).
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III. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
This section provides a critical analysis of Sproul and argues that it
selectively interpreted World-Wide Volkswagen, Asahi, and J. McIntyre––thereby departing from U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This section then applies the narrowest grounds approach to the facts of Sproul
and argues that Joy Co. lacked minimum contacts for New Mexico to
exert jurisdiction over it. This section primarily focuses on the plurality in
Sproul. While the concurrence authored a separate opinion to support
jurisdiction on other grounds, it agreed with the plurality’s rationale in
New Mexico’s ability to assert jurisdiction. As such, Sproul evidences that
New Mexico adopted a national market approach that disregards state
lines. However, Sproul’s liberal holding does not meet the burdens of due
process and New Mexico’s law on personal jurisdiction violates the U.S.
Constitution.
A. Sproul’s Interpretation of World-Wide Volkswagen, Asahi and J.
McIntyre
The Sproul plurality adopted the stream-of-commerce theory from
World-Wide Volkswagen because it represented a majority opinion of the
U.S. Supreme Court. However, that proposition was contradicted when
the plurality, “[r]eaffirm[ed] [its] preference for Justice Brennan’s stream
of commerce approach from World-Wide Volkswagen.”249 As a result, a
major justification establishing the credibility of the plurality’s argument
was lost.
Furthermore, the World-Wide Volkswagen court explicitly held that
minimum contacts serve two related functions, one of which is limiting
the reach of state courts to preserve “coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”250 World-Wide Volkswagen also stressed the importance of “state
lines for jurisdictional purposes.”251 Conversely, the Sproul plurality focused on Joy Co.’s efforts to serve the national market and rendered state
lines irrelevant. In addition, World-Wide Volkswagen’s stream-of-commerce theory is inconsistent with Sproul’s national market approach. Instead, the steam-of-commerce theory was primarily a method of
distinguishing between purposeful availment and unilateral activity. The
structure of the World-Wide Volkswagen opinion supports this argument;
immediately following the Court’s introduction of the stream-of-commerce theory, it determined that the theory was inapplicable due the
249. Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 26, 304 P.3d 18 (plurality
opinion).
250. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
251. Id. at 293.
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plaintiff’s unilaterally activity.252 Moreover, it is illogical that World-Wide
Volkswagen would stand for the proposition that targeting the national
market establishes purposeful availment. This is because Part II of the
opinion is substantially related to the interplay between federalism and
minimum contacts. In contrast, the national market approach is fundamentally at odds with federalism and state sovereignty, which was the
fundamental concept World-Wide Volkswagen highlighted throughout
the opinion.
Sproul’s holding is further weakened by the plurality’s selective interpretation of J. McIntyre. In J. McIntyre, the plurality condensed Justice
Breyer’s concurrence into a selective precept. According to the Sproul
plurality, Justice Breyer simply advocated, “that the case could be decided based on precedent . . . without ‘making broad pronouncements
that refashion basic jurisdictional rules.’”253 Yet, it failed to mention that
“broad pronouncements” referred to Justice Breyer’s overt rejection of
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s national market approach. This selective
interpretation of Justice Breyer’s concurrence also allowed the Sproul
plurality to conclude that, “[only] a plurality of the Court [in J. McIntyre]
rejected the ‘national stream of commerce’ theory as a basis for personal
jurisdiction.”254 In truth, a majority of the court rejected a “‘national
stream of commerce’ theory” as demonstrated above.
Sproul also ignored Asahi’s unanimous holding pertaining to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Asahi commanded
“careful inquiry” when exercising jurisdiction over a foreign defendant,
but Sproul made no such inquiry. For example, Asahi held that a foreign
defendant is inherently burdened by international travel and litigation in
a foreign legal system.255 Conversely, Sproul concluded that Joy Co.’s substantial revenue eased the company’s burden of international travel.
Asahi never held that the defendant’s financial strength removed the burden of foreign litigation. Moreover, Asahi Metal Company was a large
manufacturer and likely had substantial revenues just like Joy Co. Both
companies were entirely based over seas and both were burdened by international travel. Nevertheless, the plurality determined that Sproul had

252. Id. at 297–98.
253. Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 42.
254. Id. ¶ 38.
255. Asahi Metal Industry Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1986)
(“Certainly the burden on the defendant in this case is severe. Asahi has been commanded by the Supreme Court of California not only to traverse the distance between
Asahi’s headquarters in Japan and the Superior Court of California in and for the
County of Solano, but also to submit its dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign nation’s
judicial system.”).
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participated in the U.S. legal system and New Mexico’s laws were not
substantially different. Therefore, litigation in New Mexico did not present a substantial burden. However, product-liability and indemnification
law differs immensely from state to state.256
Sproul also contradicts Justice Breyer’s concurrence in J. McIntyre.
Both Joy Co. and the defendant in J. McIntyre held contracts with U.S.
distributors and held U.S. patents. Nonetheless, these facts failed to sway
Justice Breyer and Justice Alito that New Jersey’s jurisdiction was fair. In
contrast, the plurality determined that these facts made Joy Co. a seasoned legal expert on New Mexico law.
There were additional issues with Sproul’s fairness and justice analysis as well. First, the Sproul plurality misinterpreted New Mexico’s interest in the suit. Sproul and Asahi both arose from indemnification
claims.257 This is important because it directly affects the state’s interest.
In Asahi, the state’s interest did not include product safety or consumer
protection; rather, it centered on indemnification and the relationship between two manufacturers.258 Sproul directly conflicts with that principle
by holding, “New Mexico has a clear interest in resolving claims arising
from injuries occurring here as the result of defective products.”259 Instead, New Mexico’s concern pertained to protecting the financial wellbeing of New Mexican retailers. This is arguably less important than
consumer protection and preventing bodily injury.
Sproul also failed to mention the procedural and substantive interests of other nations whose interests were affected when New Mexico
asserted jurisdiction over Joy Co. Asahi required “great care” when exercising personal jurisdiction in the international context because it inevitably implicates U.S. foreign policy.260 Yet, Sproul failed to mention why
foreign policy was unaffected by New Mexico’s assertion of jurisdiction
over a Chinese manufacturer. This analysis may seem trivial but legal
scholars and Asahi argue otherwise. For example, asserting jurisdiction
may offend foreign sovereigns, provoke diplomatic protests, trigger com-

256. PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: CIVIL LAW: TORTS,
available at 0020 Surveys 29 (WestlawNext) (“This survey covers federal and state
statutes relating to products liability actions generally, and to specific types of products liability claims, e.g., manufacture and sale of firearms, food donations, and donations of bodily organs, tissue, and blood, among others.”).
257. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (“The State Supreme Court’s definition of California’s
interest, however, was overly broad. The dispute between Cheng Shin and Asahi is
primarily about indemnification rather than safety standards.”).
258. Id.
259. Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 37.
260. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
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mercial or judicial retaliation, threaten friendly relations in unrelated
fields, and contradict Congress’ Constitutional power in foreign affairs.261
B. Application of Narrowest Grounds of J. McIntyre to Sproul
A forum specific analysis of minimum contacts was an implicit consensus underlying the plurality and concurrence in J. McIntyre. In that
decision, a majority of the court rejected the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
national market approach. For instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated, “a foreign manufacturer that places a defective product in the
stream of commerce through a distribution scheme that targets a national
market, which includes New Jersey, may be subject to the in personam
jurisdiction of . . . New Jersey.”262 This same logic, almost exactly, is advocated in Sproul where the court held “[s]ufficient facts exist in this case to
determine that Joy Co. purposefully directed its activities toward the
United States market and, as a result, toward the New Mexico market as
well.”263 Therefore, the question becomes whether New Mexico could assert jurisdiction over Joy Co. without focusing on its actions in the national market. This requires a forum specific analysis of Joy Co.’s
minimum contacts in New Mexico––an analysis that falls short under
close inspection.
Sproul determined that Joy Co.’s minimum contacts were: (1) complying with U.S. safety standards, (2) utilizing an out-of state distributer
to serve New Mexico, (3) component parts incorporated into bicycles sold
by R & C and K-Mart, and (4) a Californian employee.264 First, compliance with national safety standards indicates Joy Co.’s intent to serve the
national market, not New Mexico. Additionally, there was no evidence
that Joy Co. specifically designed its products for New Mexican consumers. Second, Joy Co.’s distributor was an out-of-state company and served
the national market, not just New Mexico. Likewise, it was uncontended
that Joy Co. directed or influenced its distributor to serve New Mexican
customers. Thus, the distributer was not a contact in New Mexico. Third,
it was unspecified how many Joy Co. parts were in the state or the estimated revenue Joy Co. derived from sales in New Mexico. Fourth, Sproul
never clarified if Joy Co.’s employee ever made contact with the state.

261. See generally Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1987); John R. Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
561 (1952).
262. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 589 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub
nom. J. McIntyre Machinery, LTD. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
263. Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, ¶ 34.
264. Id. ¶¶ 27–29.
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Rather, the dissent noted that no evidence showed that Joy Co.’s employee directly served New Mexico. Notwithstanding the preceding flaws
in Joy Co.’s contacts with New Mexico, there could be sufficient minimum contacts to establish jurisdiction. This is highly dependent on the
number of Joy Co. products in the state and the frequency that the employee served New Mexican costumers. Since this information was not
provided in Sproul we are left to speculate.
C. Personal Jurisdiction After Sproul
Ironically, Sproul created the same problem for New Mexico trial
courts as the U.S. Supreme Court has created for federal district courts
because Sproul splintered just like Asahi and J. McIntyre. Moreover, instead of clarifying personal jurisdiction and the stream-of-commerce,
Sproul muddied the waters. While we wait for clarification, this author
suggests that New Mexico follow the majority’s stream-of-commerce theory in World-Wide Volkswagen as modified by J. McIntyre. Moreover,
evidentiary hearings should be used when the defendant objects to New
Mexico’s assertion of jurisdiction. This is best exemplified by another
court’s approach, which notably dealt with the same defendant in Sproul,
Joy Co.
Windsor v. Spinner Industry Co., Ltd.,265 closely parallels the events
and competing arguments raised in Sproul. The plaintiff was injured while
riding his bike and alleged that Joy Co.’s quick release mechanism was to
blame.266 The plaintiff argued that Joy Co. purposely availed itself of the
state’s jurisdiction because it indiscriminately targeted the national market, which included Maryland.267 Joy Co. moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.268
Unlike Sproul, the Maryland court used the narrowest grounds doctrine to find that J. McIntyre rejected the national market approach.269
The court stated, “[J. McIntyre] embraces the continuing significance of
individual state sovereignty and, on that basis, hold[s] that specific jurisdiction must arise from a defendant’s [minimum contacts] with the forum
state.”270 However, instead of dismissing the suit, the court determined
that an evidentiary hearing should be utilized.271 This gave the plaintiff a
chance to determine if Joy Co. had minimum contacts. This author

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

825 F. Supp. 2d 632 (2011).
Id. at 634.
Id. at 634–35.
Id.
Id. at 638.
Id.
Id. at 640.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\45-3\NMX303.txt

856

unknown

Seq: 28

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

3-JUN-15

8:59

[Vol. 45

strongly encourages that New Mexico courts adopt the same approach as
Windsor in assessing the question of minimum contacts. Furthermore, the
use of an evidentiary hearing will keep the plaintiffs in court and give the
parties a chance to litigate the claim, as well as provide a method to reach
the most complete and accurate result regarding due process.
D. Alternatives to the National Market Approach
It is critical that courts and practitioners remain cognizant that personal jurisdiction is a constitutional matter and the U.S. Supreme Court
requires forum-specific contacts. As such, New Mexico Courts must protect consumers without violating the Constitution. However, simply following New Mexico’s law on products-liability and indemnification
accomplishes this goal.
New Mexico adheres to the doctrine of strict products liability.272
This doctrine holds that a seller of a defective product is liable despite a
lack of negligence or wrongdoing on their part.273 Yet, when a downstream party in the manufacturing process is strictly liable, the non-negligent party may seek indemnification from an upstream party.274
Moreover, New Mexico’s indemnification law allows the down stream
party to transfer product liability onto the party closest to the “wrong
doer.”275
As such, liability can be imputed to an upstream party in the manufacturing process, thereby eliminating the need for a retailer to seek indemnification from a manufacturer. The state retailer may become a
defendant, but indemnity solves this dilemma. Furthermore, the law is
focused on the defendant’s relation to the wrongdoer, meaning liability
will fall on the defendant closest to the manufacture within the distribution chain. From the retailer’s perspective, the distributor is likely the
best target if the foreign manufacturer lacks minimum contacts. A distributor serving in-state retailers inherently maintains sales contracts, deliveries, order confirmations, etc. Not only does this approach provide
effective relief for in-state retailers, it also prevents unsafe products from
entering the state. If the distributor bears the burden of liability, it will
demand that its suppliers manufacturer safe products. In addition, the
manufacturer may be insulated from liability within New Mexico, but not

272. Tuijillo v. Berry, 1987-NMCA-072, ¶5, 106 N.M. 86.
273. Id.
274. Id. ¶ 13 (“We hold only that where the manufacturer and retailer are held
strictly liable in tort and the latter’s liability resulted solely from its passive role as the
retailer of the product furnished it by the manufacturer, indemnity may lie in favor of
the retailer against the manufacturer.”).
275. Id. ¶ 7.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\45-3\NMX303.txt

Summer 2015]

unknown

Seq: 29

3-JUN-15

DROWNING IN THE STREAM OF COMMERCE

8:59

857

in other forums. The distributor will likely seek indemnification in a forum where the two companies executed a service agreement. Sproul
serves as a helpful example to illustrate this argument.
R&C was subject to strict liability as a down stream party. The immediate upstream party was J&B Distributors. However, J&B was also
the closest party to the manufacturer in New Mexico. The distributor
likely shipped products, order confirmations, and order catalogs to New
Mexico retailers and thereby satisfied minimum contacts in New Mexico.
Therefore, R&C should have sought indemnification from J&B instead of
Joy Co. This approach would ensure that R&C was compensated for unknowingly selling Joy Co.’s defective product. In addition to compensating the plaintiff, holding J&B liable would prevent Joy Co.’s defective
products from entering the state. If J&B disregarded this risk, it would be
gambling every time it sold a defective Joy Co. product in New Mexico.
This approach also provides a catalyst in ultimately holding Joy Co.
liable for the injuries its products cause in New Mexico. J&B is head
quartered in Miami, Florida and likely entered into a service contract
with Joy Co. in Florida. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,276 the nonresident defendant had executed a contract that was subject to the laws in
the plaintiff’s forum state.277 Nonetheless, the Court determined that minimum contacts and due process was satisfied.278 Thus, J&B could seek indemnification from Joy Co. in Florida and the liability would ultimately
fall on Joy Co.
E. Counter Arguments and Responses to Counter Arguments
1. The New Mexico Supreme Court Commanded the Result in
Sproul
It can be argued that a 1966 New Mexico Supreme Court decision
supports Sproul’s holding. In Blount v. T D Pub. Corp.,279 the court held
that the publisher was subject to New Mexico’s jurisdiction because its
periodicals were sold through a national distribution network.280 Moreover, minimum contacts were satisfied because the publisher benefited
from a distribution channel that facilitated sales in New Mexico.281 Like
the defendant in Blount, Joy Co. sold its products to a national distributor
and indirectly profited from New Mexico consumers.

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

471 U.S. 462, 466 (1985).
Id. at 478.
Id.
1966-NMSC-262, 77 N.M. 384.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 15.
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That Blount still reflects the view of the New Mexico Supreme
Court is nothing more than a guess. First, it was decided before WorldWide Volkswagen, Asahi, and J. McIntyre. Accordingly, the New Mexico
Supreme Court has never decided which stream-of-commerce approach
reflects the view of U.S. Supreme Court. Furthermore, the two U.S. Supreme Court decisions referenced by the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Blount were majority decisions that were unrelated to product-liability
and did not involve foreign defendants. Thus, Blount’s facts are incongruent with Sproul. Moreover, Blount arose from a libel claim against the
publisher defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court decided an almost identical issue in Calder v. Jones.282 It is true that Calder relaxed the burdens of
minimum contacts required to meet due process;283 however, Calder only
applies to intentional torts.284 Therefore, Blount’s precedential value may
only extend a far as jurisdictional issues surrounding intentional torts.
Second, the Justices deciding Blount were no longer on the bench
when Sproul was decided half a century later. The New Mexico Supreme
Court, just like any appellate court, is made up of individuals who likely
have different perspectives. Third, and most importantly, the New Mexico Long-Arm Statute is coextensive with the requirements of due process. As a result, federal law determines personal jurisdiction in New
Mexico. Arguing that the New Mexico Supreme Court’s 1966 decision is
still consistent with current federal law is a risky guess.
2. J. McIntyre lacks Precedential Value
Another counter argument is that J. McIntyre is entirely open for
multiple interpretations. For example, Eastman Chemical Co. v. AlphaPet
Inc.285 held that the narrowest grounds of J. McIntyre leaves the streamof-commerce debate unresolved. Eastman Chemical Co. held that it the
precedential value of J. McIntyre was unworkable.286 Other courts have
reached the same result.287 Still, other jurisdictions have interpreted J.
282. 465 U.S. 783 (1983).
283. Id. at 787.
284. Holland America Line Inc. v. Wartsila North America, Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 460
(9th Cir. 2007) (“It is well established that the Calder test applies only to intentional
torts, not to breach of contract or negligence claims.”).
285. No. 09-971-LPS-CJB, 2011 WL 6004079, at *18, (D. Del. Nov. 4, 2011).
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (applying the narrowest grounds doctrine and holding, “we must proceed
on the premise that McIntyre did not change the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional
framework”); Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying
the narrowest grounds doctrine and holding, “Justice Breyer’s concurrence was explicitly based on Supreme Court precedent and on McIntyre’s specific facts”).
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McIntyre as adopting the stream-of-commerce “plus” test after applying
the narrowest grounds doctrine.288 As such, this conflicts with the author’s
argument that J. McIntyre commanded a majority.
Despite various interpretations, no jurisdiction has held that purposeful availment is supported by the defendant’s intention to target the
national market. In addition, in Supreme Court jurisprudence the national market approach has only received support in Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent in J. McIntyre. If a majority of Justices agreed with the national
market approach, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion would have been the majority. However, six Justices affirmatively rejected the national market approach in J. McIntyre. Accordingly, even if the narrowest grounds
approach is incompatible with J. McIntyre, we can be sure that the U.S.
Supreme Court has clearly foreclosed on any notion that the national
market can be used as a basis for a state to assert jurisdiction. Since
Sproul’s holding was rooted in the national market approach, the New
Mexico legal community should advocate for a reevaluation by the
courts.
CONCLUSION
This Note explored if Sproul was correctly decided under WorldWide-Volkswagen, Asahi, and J. McIntyre and, if not, argued for a practical solution that complies with due process but protects New Mexico consumers from defective products. This Note determined that Asahi and J.
McIntyre did not amend the stream-of-commerce theory adopted in
World-Wide Volkswagen. Nonetheless, it is evident that the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected any approach that departs from federalism and a forum
specific analysis, as the Supreme Court has overtly rejected a national
market approach in establishing personal jurisdiction. Sproul disregarded
the defendant’s minimum contacts in New Mexico and, as a result, likely
violated due process. Instead of adopting the approach in taken in Sproul,
this Note argued that New Mexican courts should utilize other judicial
tools to ensure that a plaintiff is compensated when a defective product
causes injury.
The author notes that while Sproul “represents the most sensible
approach to personal jurisdiction in the context of global commerce, it
nevertheless . . . is clearly foreclosed by the precedents of the Supreme

288. Smith v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 927, 931 (D.S.C.
2012) (“[A] ‘common denominator of the Court’s reasoning’ and ‘a position approved
by at least five Justices who support the judgment’ is the ‘stream-of-commerce plus’
[approach].”).
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Court.”289 Sproul confronted a tough issue and received little guidance
from the U.S. Supreme Court. This Note took a critical approach to
Sproul, especially the plurality opinion. The author believes that the plurality was justified on its beliefs and logic, but was wrong on the law.
Simply put, the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach does not make sense
given the global context and vast distribution chains. However, until the
U.S. Supreme Court resolves the steam-of-commerce debate, lower
courts must find creative ways to ensure that foreign manufacturers are
held accountable without violating the Constitution.

289. Windsor v. Spinner Industry Co., Ltd., 825 F.Supp.2d 632, 640 (D. Md. 2011).

